In a new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on biosafety and biosecurity, the biological agents and research standards of nine of 10 selected Group of Twenty (G20) countries had similar key features as those in US precautions.
The report to Congress assesses the extent to which G20 members’ publicly available guidance shares 10 key components of US biosafety and biosecurity recommendations for biological agents and research, as well as additional precautions the United States has taken to ensure that biomedical research labs are minimizing the risk posed by high-risk pathogens such as the Ebola and smallpox viruses.
“Research labs study and store bacteria, viruses, and other biological agents to prevent and treat infectious diseases,” the authors wrote. “Incidents involving these agents could threaten the health of researchers, nearby communities, or the general public. Biosafety and biosecurity practices ensure lab staff work safely, communities are protected, and harmful agents aren’t misused.”
GAO reviewed publicly available guidance
From January 2024 to February 2026, the GAO analyzed 10 G20 members’ publicly available guidance (such as national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines), but didn’t examine their implementation or enforcement.
G20 countries are 19 of the world’s largest economies, in addition to the European Union and the African Union. Nineteen countries and Taiwan currently have Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) labs for the most dangerous pathogens, and four more are planning or building these labs. Thirteen of the 19 countries with working BSL-4 labs are G20 members.
The 10 G20 countries in the report are the African Union, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
The 10 key US components are risk assessments, biosafety program, biosecurity program, occupational health program, emergency and incident response, institutional policies, research review and oversight, personnel training, inventory management, and material transport.
The two documents that apply broadly to biological agents and research in the United States are Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories and National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules.
Key-characteristic alignment varies widely
Documents from three countries contained language compatible with at least six of nine of the US key components for high-risk biological agents and research. Five countries’ documents included language that was a combination of comparable and somewhat comparable with most key components. Two countries’ documents had language that didn’t align with or contain any language in the key areas.
Five members’ documents did not include comparable or somewhat comparable aspects of the key component related to protecting sensitive information and maintaining research confidentiality.
Documents from three member countries didn’t include comparable or somewhat comparable language for the biosecurity program component, and those from four countries didn’t use comparable or somewhat comparable language for the inventory management component.
Japan’s guidance didn’t share any of the 10 key components with the United States, while Canada had all 10, with wide variation—particularly for high-risk pathogens—in the remaining countries.
“While nine members’ documents included comparable or somewhat comparable language for the Institutional Policies component, five members’ documents did not include comparable or somewhat comparable aspects of the key component related to protecting sensitive information and maintaining research confidentiality,” the report said.
Australia, Canada, China language most similar to US
Guidance from Australia, Canada, and China contained similar language as most of the additional precautions for high-risk biological agents for nine of the 10 key components included in US documents. Australian officials said that in their country, state and territory governments are also tasked with managing biosecurity risk by, for example, responding to animal disease outbreaks.
“It is possible that some members have additional guidance documents that we did not have access to for high-risk agents and research,” the report said. “However, if G20 members do not provide guidance documents for high-risk agents and research, it could increase biosafety and biosecurity risks, such as nefarious actors gaining access to these biological agents.”
“Further, high-risk agents could be released, accidentally or intentionally, and potentially expose the community if labs do not track materials exposed to high-risk agents (e.g., infected animals and plants) or report lab incidents (e.g., lost infectious agents) in a timely fashion,” it added.
The GAO sent the 10 included countries report excerpts for technical comment, and seven responded. The technical comments were incorporated as appropriate.
